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REPORTS OF CASES 
!' 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
(46 C.2d 3: 291 P.2d B2tJ 
[So F. No. 19347. In Bank. Dee. 29, 1955.J 
JOHN ROGERS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Prohibition-Application of Rules-Oriminal Proceedings-
Accusatory Pleading.-A writ of prohibition cannot be used to 
review the rulings on the admissibility of evidence received by 
the magistrate at the preliminary hearing; the scope of review 
is simply to determine whether the magistrate has held defend-
ant to answer without reasonable or probable cause to believe 
a public offense has been committed with which defendant 
is connected, and not whether the magistrate erred on questions 
of admissibility of evidence, although a defendant is held 
to answer without reasonable or probable cause if his com-
mitment is based entirely on incompetent evidence. (See Pen. 
Code, §§ 995, 999a.) 
[2] Indictment and Information-Necessity for.-A court has no 
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of an offense without a 
valid indictment or information. (Const., art. I, § 8; Pen. 
Code, § 682.) 
[1] See Oa1.Jur., Prohibition, § 21; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,4,7] Prohibition, § 44; [2] Indictment 
and Information, § 1; [3] Prohibition, § 16(1); [5, 6] Criminal 
Law, § 175; [8] Criminal Law, § 177; [9] Criminal Law, § 16~; 
[10] Criminal Law, § 465; [11] Criminal Law, § 485; [12-14] 
Criminal Law, § 467. 
(3 ) 
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[8] Prohibition-Grounds-Excess of Jurisdiction.-Prohibition is 
the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of 
jurisdiction. 
14] Id.-Application of Rules-Oriminal Proceedings-Accusatory 
Pleading.-Prohibition is an appropriate means to test the 
right of the People to proceed with a prosecution when the 
validity of an indictment or information is challenged on the 
ground that defendant has been indicted or committed with-
out reasonable or probable cause. 
[6] Oriminal Law~Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer 
-Sufficient Oause.-"Sufficient cause" and "reasonable and 
probable cause" mean such a state of facts as would lead a 
man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and con-
scientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the accused's guilt, 
but the proof which will authorize a magistrate in holding the 
accused for trial must consist of legal, competent evidence. 
(Pen. Code, § 871.) 
[6] Id.-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer-Sufficient 
Oause.-An information that is based entirely on hearsay or 
incompetent evidence is unauthorized. 
[7] Prohibition-Application of Rules-Oriminal Proceedings-
Accusatory Pleading.-When prohibition is sought under Pen. 
Code, § 999a, on the ground that petitioner has been committed 
without reasonable or probable cause, the writ will issue if no 
competent evidence was offered at the preliminary examination 
to support a reasonable belief that the offense charged was 
committed and that defendant committed it. 
[8] Oriminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer 
-Sufficient Oause.-Testimony. to the effect that unknown 
persons posed as being able to obtain the release of a missing 
girl for ransom, when offered merely to show that the conver-
sation was held and not to prove the truth of the statements 
made by unidentified callers, is not hearsay, but is competent 
and supports a reasonable belief that the offenses of attempted 
extortion (Pen. Code, § 524) and posing as kidnappers for 
the purpose of extorting money (Pen. Code, § 210), with which 
the accused persons are charged, were committed. 
[9] Id.-Preliminary Proceedings-Rights of Defendant.-Deten-
tion of defendant beyond the 48-hour statutory maximum with-
out being taken before a magistrate (Pen. Code, § 825) is 
illegal. 
[10] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions.-A pretrial confession is admis-
sible, so far as due process is concerned, if it is voluntarily 
made. 
[3] See Oal.Jur., Prl)hibition, § 4; Am.lur., Prohibition, §§ 20, 24. 
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[11] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions.-The test ordinarily used by 
state courts to determine the admissibility of a confession is 
whether, eonsidering the cir~mstances, it was freely and 
voluntarily made without any inducement held out to the 
accused. 
[12] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions.-California has not adopted the 
federal rule that a confession made during a period of illegal 
detention is inadmissible. 
[13] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-There is a basic distinction be-
tween evidence seized in violation of the search and seizure 
provisions of the federal and state Constitutions and voluntary 
statements made during a period of illegal detention i such a 
voluntary admission is not a necessary product of the illegal 
detention, whereas evidence obtained by an illegal search or 
by a coerced confession is the necessary product of the search 
or of the coercion. 
[14] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions.-Where there is no evidence that 
defendant's illegal detention produced admissions made to the 
police, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Alameda County from further proceedings under an 
information. Writ denied. 
William H. Coburn, Jr., for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith, Deputy 
Attorney General, and J. F. Coakley, District Attorney (Ala-
meda), for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner and L. C. Elliot were charged 
in one count of an information with posing as kidnappers for 
the purpose of extorting money (Pen. Code, § 210) and, in 
another count with attempted extortion. (Pen. Code, § 524.) 
Petitioner's motion under section 995 of the Penal Code to set 
aside the information on the ground that there is no reasonable 
or probable cause to believe that he committed the offenses 
charged was denied, and he now seeks prohibition to prevent 
further proceedings against him. (See Pen. Code, § 999a.) 
The District Court of Appeal issued the alternative writ, 
and the cause was thereafter transferred to this court. 
[11] Admissibility of confession as affected by delay in arraign-
ment of prisoner, note, 19 A.L.R.2d 1331. See also OaJ..Jur.2d, 
Evidence, § 131; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 482. 
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On April 28, 1955, the 14-year-old daughter of Dr. Charles 
S. Bryan, Jr., disappeared. Late in the evening of April 
28th or 29th, Dr. Bryan received a telephone call, and an 
unknown voice advised him that if he delivered $5,000 at a 
sI1ecified location his daughter would be released. When he 
asked for proof that the caller had his daughter another 
voice replied, "I ain't got no proof, it is just a chance you 
will have to take, bring it to Eighth and Market and she will 
be turned loose." The second voice also stated that "If 
there is any slip-ups it will be your daughter's life, not mine." 
In addition to the foregoing evidence, admissions made to the 
police by the defendants following their arrest were intro-
duced at the preliminary hearing. Petitioner was arrested 
on May 17, 1955, and was not taken before a magistrate 
and arraigned until May 25, 1955. It was during this period, 
on May 21st, that he made the admissions to the arresting 
officer that connect him with the crime. 
Petitioner contends that his commitment was based entirely 
on incompetent evidence and that the peremptory writ should 
ther~fore issue. He claims that without his admissions there 
was no evidence to connect him with the crime and that his 
admissions were inadmissible on the grounds that there was 
no competent proof of the corpus delicti and that they come 
within the exclusionary rule of People v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 
434 [282 P.2d 905], since they were made during the period 
of his illegal detention in violation of section 825 of the 
Penal Code. 
I 
[1] The attorney general contends that the writ of pro-
hibition cannot be used to review the rulings on the admissi-
bility of evidence received by the magistrate at the preliminary 
examination, that to construe sections 995· and 999a t of the 
.,' The indictment or information must be set aside by the court in 
which the defendant is arraigned. upon his motion, in either of the 
following eases: 
"If it be an indictment: 
"1. Where it is not found. endorsed. and presented as prescribed in 
thia code. 1, 
"2. That the defendant has been indicted without reasonable or prob- 'I:,' 
able cause. . 
, 'If it be an information: l 
"1. That before the filing thereof the defendant had not been legally 
committed by a magistrate. 
"2. That the defendant had been committed without reasonable or 
probable cause." 
t" A petition for a writ of prohibition. predicated upon the ground 
that the indictment was found without reasonable or probable cause or 
that the defendant had been committed on an information without reason-
Dec. 1955] RooERS V. SUPERIOR COURT 
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Penal Code as providing for a full scale review of the rulings 
would be contrary to the purpose of the preliminary exami-
nation, and that the scope of review is simply to determine 
whether the magistrate has held the defendant to answer 
without reasonable or probable cause to believe a public 
offense has been committed with which the defendant is con-
nected, and not whether the magistrate erred on questions of 
admissibility of evidence. We agree with this contention with 
this qualification: A defendant has been held to answer 
without reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is 
based entirely on incompetent evidence, and for the following 
reasons the peremptory writ will issue to prohibit further 
proceedings against him. 
[2] A court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial 
of an offense without a valid indictment or information. 
(Greenberg v. Superior Oourt, 19 Ca1.2d 319, 321 [121 P.2d 
713] ; Cal. Const., art. I, § 8; Pen. Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Pro-
hibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in 
excess of jurisdiction (Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.2d 
630, 637 [284 P.2d 9] ; Rescue Army v. Municipal Oourt, 28 
Ca1.2d 460,463 [171 P.2d 8]), and it is an appropriate means 
to test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution 
when the validity of an indictment or information is chal-
lenged on the ground that the defendant has been indicted 
or committed without reasonable or probable cause. ( Green-
berg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Ca1.2d 319, 323; Whitlock v. 
Superior Oourt, 97 Cal.App.2d 26, 30 [217 P.2d 158] ; Jackson 
v. Superior Oourt, 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [219 P.2d 879] ; 
Hall v. Superior Oourt, 120 Cal.App.2d 844, 850 [262 P.2d 
351] ; Pen. Code, §§ 995, 999a.) 
[5] Section 871 of the Penal Code provides: "If, after 
hearing the proofs, it appears that either no public offense 
has been committed or that there is not sufficient cause to 
believe the defendant guilty of a public offense, the magis-
trate must order the defendant to be discharged, ••. " (Italics 
added.) "Sufficient cause" and "reasonable and probable 
cause", mean such a state of facts as would lead a man of 
ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously 
able or probable cause, must be filed in the appellate court within. 15 
days after a motion made under Section 995 of this code to set aside 
the indictment on the ground that the defendant has been indicted with-
out reasonable or probable cause or that the defendant has been com-
mitted on an information without reasonable or probable cause, has been 
deniid by the trial court. • • ." 
8 ROGERS V. SUPERIOR COURT [46 C.2d 
entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused 
(People v. Nagel, 25 Ca1.2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 344]), but, 
"[t]he proof which will authorize a magistrate in holding 
an accused person for trial must consist of legal, competent 
evidence. No other type of evidence may be considered by 
the magistrate. 'l'he rules of evidence require the' production 
of legal evidence' and the exclusion of 'whatever is not legal' 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1825; •.. )." (People v. Schuber, 71 
Cal.App.2d 773, 775 [163 P.2d 498].) [6] An information 
that is based entirely on hearsay or incompetent evidence is 
unauthorized. (In re Flodstrom, 134 Cal.App.2d 871 [277 P.2d 
101J; Hall v. Superior Court, 120 Cal.App.2d 844, 850 [262 
P.2d 351] ; Dong Haw v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.2d 153, 
159 [183 P.2d 724J ; People v. Schuber, supra, 71 Cal.App.2d 
773, 777; In re Schuber, 68 Cal.App.2d 424, 425 [156 P.2d 
944] ; In re Martinez, 36 Cal.App.2d 687, 689 [98 P.2d 528] ; 
see also People v. Proctor, 108 Cal.App.2d 739, 742 [239 P.2d 
697]; 7 Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 120, p. 984.) [7] Ac-
cordingly, when prohibition is sought under section 999a of 
the Penal Code, the writ will issue if no competent evidence 
was offered at the preliminary examination to support 8. 
reasonable belief that the offense charged was committed and 
that the defendant committed it. 
Petitioner bases his contention that there was no competent 
proof of the corpus delicti and that therefore his admissions 
were not admissible against him, on the ground that since 
Dr. Bryan was unable to identify the voices he heard over 
the telephone, his testimony concerning the call is inadmissible 
hearsay. The testimony, however, to the effect that unknown 
persons posed as being able to obtain the release of Dr. Bryan's 
daughter for ransom, was offered merely to show that the 
conversation was held, and not to prove the truth of the 
statements made by the unidentified callers. Such evidence 
is not hearsay. (People v. Kelley, 22 Ca1.2d 169, 176 [137 
P.2d 1] ; People v. MacArthur, 125 Cal.App.2d 212, 219 [270 
P.2d 37] ; People v. Henry, 86 Cal.App.2d 785, 789 [195 P.2d 
·fiS] ; reo})le v. Klein, 71 Cnl.App.~J 588, 592 [163 P.2d 71] ; 
People v. Radley, 68 Cal.A.pp.2d 607, 609 [157 P.2d 426] ; 
People v. Gaertner, 43 Cal.App.2J 388, 395 [110 P.2d 1002].) 
[3] The testimony was not only competent, but it covered 
each of the essential clements of the crimes charged and 
supports a rcnsonaLle belief that these offenses were com-
mitted. We thus reach petitioner's basic contention that his 
) 
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admissions were inadmissible under People v. Cahan, supra, 
44 Ca1.2d 434. 
There can be no doubt that th~ admissions were made during 
a period of illegal detention .. The arresting officer testified 
that he arrested defendant on the afternoon of May 17th. The 
conversation was held at about 10 :15 a.m. on May 21st, or 
approximately 90 hours after the arrest. Even then defend-
ant was not taken before the magistrate until ~Iay 25th, eight 
days after his arrest. [9] Section 825 of the Penal Code 
provides: 
"The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magis-
trate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 
two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holi-
days; ... " 
There is nothing to indicate that a magistrate was unavail-
able on the Tuesday afternoon of the arrest or at sometime 
within the 48-hour period following it. Detention beyond 
the 48-hour statutory maximum without being taken before 
a magistrate is unquestionably illegal.· 
In this state the admissibility of voluntary admissions or 
confessions made during illegal detention was first questioned 
in People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45, 48. The contention that 
voluntary conversations with the police officer illegally detain-
ing defendant were inadmissible, solely by reason of the illegal 
detention, was rejected as unfounded in principle or authority. 
Since that time, however, the federal courts have adopted 
the rule that a confession during a period of illegal detention 
is inadmissible (McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63 
S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819], rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 784 [63 
S.Ct. 1322, 87 L.Ed. 1727]; Upshaw v. United States, 335 
U.S. 410, 413 [69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100]; "[A] confes-
sion is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to 
failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing 
magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is the result of 
torture, physical or psychological.' " United States v. Leviton, 
193 F.2d 848, 853), but, "[T]he rule of the McNabb case, 
o 0 • is not a limitation imposed by the Due Process Clause. 
[Citations.] Compliance with the McNabb rule is required 
:in federal courts by [the Supreme Court] through its power 
of supervision over the procedure and practices of federal 
·Section 145 of the Penal Code provides: "Every public officer or 
other person, having' arrested any person upon n crimina) charge, who 
willfully delays to take such person before a magiRtrate having juris· 
diction, to take his examination, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
I 
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courts in the trial of criminal cases." (Gallegos v. Nebraska, 
342 U.S. 55, 63, 64 [72 S.Ot. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86].) [10] A 
pretrial confession is admissible, so far as due process is 
concerned, if it is voluntarily made. (Gallegos v. Nebraska, 
• s'u,pra, 342 U.S. 55, 65; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 
285, 286 [56 8.0t. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682] ; Chambers v. Florida, 
309 U.S. 227, 236, 238 [60 8.0t. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716] ; Lisenba v. 
Cal·ifornia, 314 U.S. 219, 238 [62 S.Ot. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166].) 
There is no contention in this case that the admissions were 
involuntary. 
[11] The test ordinarily used by state courts to determine 
the admissibility of a confession is, whether, considering all 
the circumstances, it was freely and voluntarily made without 
any inducement held out to the accused. (See 19 A.L.R.2d 
1332, 1336-1346; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 482.) [12] Since 
the McNabb case, the state courts that have had occasion 
to reevaluate their test of admissibility as it applies to a con-
fession made during illegal detention continue to treat delay 
in arraignment as only one of the factors to be considered in 
determining whether the statement was voluntarily made. 
Apparently none of the states following the rule excluding 
illegally obtained evidence have adopted the rule of the 
McNabb case; and we are not disposed to adopt it. 
[13] There is a basic distinction between evidence seized 
in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the Oon-
E.titution of the United States and the Constitution of Oali-
fornia and the laws enacted thereunder, and voluntary state-
ments made during a period of illegal detention. It may be 
true, as petitioner contends, that had he been arraigned within 
48 hours and advised of his rights, he would not have volun-
teered to say anything. (Cf. People v. Stroble, 36 Ca1.2d 615, 
G26, 627 [226 P.2d 330] ; and see People v. Zammora, 66 Cal. 
App.2d 166, 220 [152 P.2d 180].) Nevertheless, there is 
lacking the essential connection between the illegal detention 
and the voluntary statements made during that detention that 
there is between the illegal search and the evidence obtained 
thereby, or between the coercion and the confession induced 
thereby. The voluntary admission is not a necessary product 
of the illegal detention; the evidence obtained by an illegal 
search or by a coerced confession is the necessary product of 
the search or of the coercion. When questioned by arresting 
officers a suspect may remain silent or make only such state· 
ments as serve his interest; the victim of an illegal search, 
however, has no opportunity to select the items to be taken 
I 
1 
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by the rummaging officer (State v. Sanford, State v. Ellis, 354 
Mo. 998, 1012 [193 S.W.2d 37, 38] concurring opinion of 
Hyde, J.; State v. Gu.astamac7tio. 137 Conn. 179 [75 A.2d 429, 
431]; c/., Milbourn v. State, 212 Ind. 161 [8 N.E.2d 985, 
!l86] ; Qu-an v. State, 185 Miss. 513 [188 So. 568, 569] ; 14 So. 
Cal.L.Rev. 477), and the victim of a coerced confession has 
been deprived of any choice. [14] The record of the pre-
liminary examination is devoid of any implication that the 
detention in this case was resorted to for the purpose of 
inducing the admissions, and petitioner makes no contention 
that they were not freely and voluntarily made. Accordingly, 
since there is no evidence that the illegal detention produced 
the admissions, we find the exclusionary rule inapplicable. 
The alternative writ of prohibition is discharged, and a 
peremptory writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J. pro 
tem.,· concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with all of the opinion except that portion which 
holds that admissions or confessions of a defendant are admis-
sible against him even though they are obtained while he 
is being illegally detained contrary to section 825 of the Penal 
Code, quoted in the majority opinion. I believe that we 
should follow the federal rule as announced by the United 
States Supreme Court (Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 
[69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100] ; McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332 [63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819]). One of the reasons 
for the provisions that a person arrested be promptly taken 
before a magistrate such as section 825 of the Penal Code 
is: " ... to check resort by officers to 'secret interrogation of 
persons accused of crime.'" (Upshaw v. United States, 
supra, 335 U.S. 410, 412.) In McNabb v. United States, supra, 
318 U.S. 332, 343, the court said after pointing out the rule 
that a person must be promptly charged after arrest: "The 
purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal 
procedure is plain. A democratic society, in which respect 
for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tr!lcking 
down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judg-
ment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone 
*Assiped by Chairman of Judicial Council 
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prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has there-
fore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the 
dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful 
instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a 
• single functionary. The complicated process of criminal jus-
tice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for 
which is separately vested in the various participants upon 
whom the criminal law relies for its vindication. Legislation 
such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable 
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, 
constitutes an important safeguard-not only in assuring pro-
tection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of 
the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progres-
sive and self-confident society. For this procedural require-
ment checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as 
the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as 
indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid 
an the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons 
accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy 
view of law enforcement. It outlaws easy but self-defeating 
ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instru-
ment of crime detection. A statute carrying such purposes 
is expressive of a general legislative poliey to which courts 
should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for 
its application." And in the same vein William Wicker, 
Dean of the University of Tennessee College of Law, says: 
"The objectives of prompt-arraignment statutes include giv-
ing the suspect a preliminary hearing before a committing 
official, informing him as to his constitutional privilege of 
remaining silent, and affording him an opportunity to obtain 
counsel and secure bail. Holding the suspect incommunicado 
furnishes the setting most favorable for obtaining a confession. 
A high percentage of improperly induced confessions occur 
while the suspect is being held 'on ice' in violation of arraign-
ment statutes. This kind of violation of a duty towards a 
suspect involves very little risk from the standpoint of the 
lawless police officer. A prosecuting attorney will very seldom, 
if ever, use a confession obtained by his investigating officer 
and then prosecute the officer for illegally obtaining the 
confession. Furthermore, even a successful criminal prosecu-
tion gives no redress to the victim. There are also obvious 
practical obstacles to a convicted criminal's successfully main-
taining a civil suit for damages against an officer who illegally 
detained him and thereby obtained the evidence to convict 
Dec. 1955] ROGERS V. SUPERIOR COURT 
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him. If the victim dares to bring a civil action, he is not only 
faced with pUblicity and the :risk of wasting time and money, 
but also with the risk of creating such a degree of ill-feeling 
between himself and the police that he may have reason to 
fear police retribution. If the victim obtains a judgment, the 
damages may be nominal. Even if the victim obtains a sub-
stantial judgment, it often cannot be collected out of a police 
officer's meager resources." (5 V and.L.Rev. 507, 511.) 
Our statutes (Pen. Code, §§ 145, 825) make it mandatory 
that a person arrested be taken before a magistrate without 
unnecessary delay, in no case less than two days and an officer 
violating the section is subject to imprisonment in the county 
jail not exceeding six months or fine not e:x.ceeding $500 or 
both. (Pen. Code, §§ 19, 145.) Unless admissions or confes-
sions are excluded when obtained in violation of those provi-
sions they will have little force. The situation is not different 
than the unlawful search and seizure cases (People v. Oahan, 
44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]). The distinction suggested 
by the majority opinion, that is, that an admission obtained 
during illegal detention is not necessarily the product of the 
illegal detention while the goods unlawfully seized are a 
necessary product of the illegal seizure, fails to take into 
account that the purpose of the speedy taking of a prisoner 
before a magistrate is to avoid confessions or admissions before 
a person is advised of the charges against him and his right 
to counsel, etc. Necessarily embraced within that purpose is 
the thought that such admissions obtained during illegal 
restraint will be coerced. Moreover, the purpose being as 
heretofore stated the Legislature has decided by making the 
requirement (Pen. Code, § 825) that admissions so obtained 
are necessarily a product of the illegal detention and the 
coercion inherent therein. 
It appears to be the settled rule both in California and 
throughout the United States that where a statute provides 
that certain conduct shall be penalized, rights assertedly based 
on such conduct are void, of no effect, and hence unenforce-
able, even though the statute does not specifically so declare. 
(Oity of Oakland v. Oalifornia Const. 00., 15 Cal.2d 573 
[104 P.2d 30] ; Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119 [57 P. 777, 
73 Am.St.Rep. 31, 45 L.R.A. 420] ; Adams v. Minor, 121 Cal. 
372 [53 P. 815] ; Meyer v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. 102 
[53 P. 434, 66 Am.St.Rep. 22, 41 L.R.A. 762] ; Visalia Gas &-
E. L. 00. v. Sims, 104 Cal. 326 [37 P. 1042, 43 Am.St.Rep. 
105]; Morill v. Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452 [28 P. 1068, 27 
Am.St.Rep. 207]; Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370 [22 P. 
880] ; Santa Clara Valley Mill &- Lbr. Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 
387 [18 P. 391, 9 Am.St.Rep. 211]; Swanger v. Mayberry, 
01, 59 Cal. 91; Raym011d v. Bartlett, 77 Cal.App.2d 283 [175 P.2d 
288]; Salada Beach etc. Dist. v. Anderson, 50 Cal.App.2d 
306 [123 P.2d 86]; County of Marin v. Messner, 44 Cal. 
App.2d 577 [112 P.2d 731] ; Miller v. City of Martinez, 28 
Cal.App.2d 364 [82 P.2d 519] ; City of Los Angeles v. Watter. 
son, 8 Cal.App.2d 331 [48 P.2d 87] ; Hobbs, Wall &- Co. v. 
Moran, 109 Cal.App. 316 [293 P. 145] ; Oounty of Shasta v. 
Moody, 90 Cal.App. 519 [265 P. 1032] ; Noble v. Oity of Palo 
Alto, 89 Cal.App. 47 [264 P. 529]; Nielson v. Richards, 75 
Cal.App. 680 [243 P. 697]; Stockton Plumbing etc. Co. v. 
Wheeler, 68 Cal.App. 592 [229 P. 1120].) It should follow 
from the foregoing that since the detention here was in 
violation of express statutory authority, anything obtained by 
the prosecution from the defendant while subjected to such 
unlawful detention could not be relied upon in support of 
the charge against him. 
For the foregoing reasons I would grant the relief prayed 
for. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
